Algeria & Morocco: Natural Gas Cartels, Fertilizer Mercantilism, and Rising Tensions

This originally appeared last week at The Oil Drum. I may have a brief, original post this week if time permits.

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Algeria is one of the world’s most important oil and gas exporters. Morocco has no significant oil and gas production, but has about 2/3 of the world’s rock phosphate reserves, a critical component in global fertilizer supply that increased 300% in price in the past year (.pdf) and may peak alongside global oil production. The two nations have historically been at odds, especially over the phosphate-rich territory of Western Sahara. Now, more than ever, their exports are critical to the energy and food supplies of the world. Alongside increasing importance, tensions between the two are on the rise as the US and Russia provoke the situation with massive opposing arms deals and bi-lateral trade agreements. This article will look at the forces behind these rising tensions and consider issues of fertilizer mercantilism, infrastructure vulnerability, and the potential formation of a natural gas cartel.


Will Demand for Gas & Fertilizer Bring New Conflict to Morocco & Algeria?
Country Briefs:

Algeria: Algeria is an important exporter of both oil and natural gas (background .ppt on NG supplies to Europe). Algeria is Europe’s third largest supplier of natural gas, providing 30+ bcm via pipelines and 20+ bcm via LNG tanker in 2007. Major projects are currently underway to expand pipeline infrastructure to Italy (via Tunisia) and to Spain (both direct undersea and via Morocco), and to expand LNG export capability. Algeria hopes to expand total natural gas exports to 85 bcm/year by 2010, making their production roughly the equivalent of Norway (Europe’s 2nd largest provider). Significantly, the potential to expand natural gas supplies to Europe enhances Algeria’s importance as an alternative supplier in light of current dependence on uncertain Russian gas supplies. Algeria also faces an active Islamist insurgency, a separate threat from the rising al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb, and serious demographic challenges in the form of a 1.22% population growth rate (graph) and sharp ethnic divisions (map).


Figure 1: Algeria's Place Among African Natural Gas Reserves

Morocco: Morocco's importance to the global economy is due to its control of at least 2/3 of the world's reserves of rock phosphate. The USGS has stated that there are no substitutes (.pdf) for rock phosphate in agriculture. With biofuel demand increasing steadily, and world food shortages hitting the headlines, rock phosphate is arguably as important to the world situation as oil supply. Importantly, Patrick Dery has performed a Hubbert Lineraization on world phosphorus production and estimates that we have already passed peak phosphorus (see graph below). While the importance of rock phosphate has been discussed here before, its impact on the situation between Morocco and Algeria has not. Additionally, fertilizer supplies are a critical component of many biofuel projects, creating an interrelationship between phosphate and energy supplies. Like Algeria, Morocco faces an internal Islamist insurgency (though currently less troublesome than in Algeria) and has significant demographic challenges with a population growth rate of 1.6% (graph) and sharp ethnic divides (map).


Figure 2: Peak Phosphorus? A Hubbert Lineraization of Global Phosphate Production

Tensions: The Sand War, Western Sahara, and Islamist Insurgencies

There are several sources of tension between Morocco and Algeria. The two states fought the Sand War from 1963-64 over a mineral-rich border territory. In 1975, when Morocco took control of Western Sahara, Algeria began overtly backing the Polisario Front in an ongoing insurgency that continued unchecked until a 1991 cease fire. Both states also suffer from internal Islamist insurgencies, exacerbated by increasing demographic problems. The situation in Algeria is most severe: after independence from France, the revolutionary National Liberation Front ruled the country until Islamists won the first free elections in 1991, prompting the military to immediately seize control. More than 160,000 people were killed in the ensuing civil war between 1992 and 2002. While the country is relatively peaceful today, factions of the Islamist rebels have remained, operating out of rural regions inside the Malian border and elsewhere in the Sahara, and have recently merged with al-Qa'ida to form AQIM (al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb). The group has recently carried out several attacks in Algeria, including the April 11 2007 Algiers Bombing, the December 11 2007 Algiers bombing, the 2007 Batna bombing, and the 2007 Dellys bombing, as well as being possibly involved in the 2007 Casablanca bombing in Morocco. The pace of attacks has not slowed, with at least five bombings in the last two months alone.

Infrastructure Targeting?

While Algerian Islamists have generally mirrored target selection of Islamist groups elsewhere, one attack in December, 2006, specifically targeted Haliburton workers in Algeria. This tactic, of targeting critical infrastructure and energy industries, has been increasing around the world as non-state groups everywhere realize that they can maximize their return on investment with these targets. With rising internal threats and state sponsored proxy conflicts, and the potential for direct state military attacks no longer too remote to consider, it is concerning that both Algeria and Morocco present some extremely high ROI energy and resource infrastructure targets:

- Morocco: The Fosbucraa Conveyor, the world’s longest conveyor belt, transporting phosphates from the world's largest phosphate mine at Bou Kra 100km to the port of el Aioun. The conveyor was successfully attacked several times by the Polisario Front. Here's a satellite image.

- Algerian pipelines & LNG infrastructure: Algeria is chock full of high-vulnerability, high-consequence targets. Algeria recently signed a 100 million euro contract with French defense firm Thales to secure oil and gas pipelines. With 16,200 km of major pipelines to protect in Algeria alone (and scheduled to increase to 21,000 km by 2010), the task is daunting. Additionally, two potential future infrastructure projects may represent appealing targets. The proposed Trans-Saharan natural gas pipeline, that would deliver Nigerian natural gas to Europe via a 4,550 km pipeline, would represent a lengthy and vulnerable target to multiple groups if it is ever built (construction is “penciled in” to start in 2015). Additionally, speculative plans (such as the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Cooperative, or TREC) to leverage high solar insolation in the Sahara to generate electricity for Europe would require huge transmission infrastructure that would be both highly vulnerable and highly attractive. Neither the Trans-Saharan pipeline nor TREC is in any danger of being built in the immediate future.

Thoughts on the Future: Proxy Wars & Proxy Mercantilism

Recently, the fragile 1991 cease fire agreement with the Western Saharan Polisario Front has become increasingly unstable. Complicating the situation with Western Sahara, French President Sarkozy announced his support to Morocco's decision to postpone indefinitely the self-determination referendum promised in the 1991 accord, along with increased Algerian support to Polisario leadership. All this comes against a backdrop of rising military tensions between Morocco and Algeria. In 2008, the US doubled military aide to Morocco and announced arms deals worth billions of dollars. At the same time, various sources confirmed that Russian concluded a $7.5 billion deal to provide advanced arms to Algeria.

Is there any deeper meaning behind these moves? At least two possibilities must be considered. The first is proxy-mercantilism by the United States to secure control of phosphate supplies. In 2004, the US entered into a bi-lateral free trade agreement with Morocco. This can be explained as a natural extension of the long history of economic and military cooperation between the US and Morocco, but in light of proposed biofuel programs, skyrocketing rock phosphate prices, potentially peaking phosphate production, and mercantilist moves by other great powers, the more nefarious possibilities must be considered. The second possibility is that Russia hopes to leverage increased influence with Algeria to exert greater influence in global natural gas markets. Because Algeria is one of Western Europe's few true alternatives to Russian natural gas supplies, especially given the prospect of sharp increases in Algerian natural gas exports, Algeria represents either a threat to Russian natural gas leverage, or a great enhancement of that leverage by entering a defacto gas cartel. At a minimum, we know that Russia and Algeria are actively engaged in talks on this topic. Also, a recent offer by Gazprom to buy all of Libya's additional oil and gas production supports this suggestions that Russia hopes to control Europe's alternative sources of natural gas.

Both notions of phosphate mercantilism and a gas cartel are merely informed speculation at this point, but the stakes are so high that these possibilities must be considered. While there may be no deeper motive behind recent moves with Morocco and Algeria, at a minimum the stakes and tensions are increasing. Because both Algeria and Morocco are fragile Nation-States, with active Islamist separatist movements, significant internal terrorist threats, and complicated ethnic/territorial problems, the potential for interruption in critical exports of phosphate, oil, and gas is increasing.

Demand Bifurcation Point

The future of the global economy will, in my opinion, turn more on this question than any other:

Will demand destruction hit India and China, or will their oil consumption continue to rise?

The answer here will determine much of how peak oil plays out. It isn't a "tipping point" where we'll suddenly enter a post-peak world, or an energy-scarcity world. We're already there. Rather, this is a "bifurcation point"--a potential radical divergence in the impact that peak oil has on the global system.

If the Indian and Chinese economies are fragile--as many think--and can't continue to grow with $150 oil, then they will cut back on demand, and oil prices may stabilize as global oil demand stays in line with gradually declining global net oil exports. This will allow for a more gradual response to energy scarcity, a re-tooling toward renewable sources, new settlement patterns, etc. If, however, the Indian and Chinese economies are much more resilient than many think--as I think is the case--then Indian and Chinese oil demand will continue to rise rapidly, more than making up for any demand destruction in the more mature western economies. The result will be continued rapid price oil price increases, additional economic stress in the West, and greater turmoil in general. I think the answer to the question will largely turn on the vibrancy of internal consumer demand from the growing middle class in both states. It's simply too early to predict with confidence, but here's an indicator that suggests Indian and Chinese oil demand will continue growing:

China June Auto Sales up 15% Year-on-Year

That's 836,000 new cars in China in June alone. And, significantly, in China the majority of these new cars are the first car for an individual consumer--so these aren't replacing existing cars that were already on the road, but rather are new cars that weren't on the road before. In India, May auto sales were up 14% year-on-year to 110,000 cars--that shows how much room to grow India has just to catch up to China's level of automobile penetration in the populace! GM expects global auto sales to increase 4% in 2008, meaning 2.8 million more vehicles will be sold this year than last. Especially considering that sales in mature western economies are expected to stagnate or decline, the majority of these new sales will come in developing nations where they are disproportionately more likely to represent a new, additional car on the road, not a replacement car.

The prospects for global demand destruction are not looking good. Oil is a globally fungible commodity--demand destruction in the US may be rising very slowly, but this is irrelevant in the face of rising global demand. Personal investments in cars increase the inelasticity of demand--when people have sunk cost in a car, it skews their calculation on the value vs. cost of consuming gasoline. Unless the trend in global car sales turns around, it's hard to envision a long-term retreat in oil prices...

Vernacular Zen (re-post)

I'll post new content next Monday with a cross-post of an article on Algeria & Morocco that will soon appear in The Oil Drum. In the interim, here's a re-post of one of my favorite posts from 2004, and a much needed dose of denial-free optimism for these troubled times:

Vernacular Zen: Glimpses of "The Original Affluent Society"

I am an advocate of localization, simplification, self-sufficiency and fulfilled ontogeny. Slow food. Tribalism. A thousand other catch-phrases that, above all else, raise a singular objection from friends and critics alike: isn't your idealized vision starkly juxtaposed to your professed enjoyment of the finer things in life?

My response: on the contrary, my good friend...these worlds are in fact one in the same, only separated by the disinformation of the consumer economy.

Povero o Rico?? Is this an image of a "poor" fishing village or one of the worlds most exclusive resort islands? Actually, it's both--a picture of the idyllic island of Panarea (just North of Sicily) taken by the author while sailing away aboard the 38' sailboat "Fandango."

I have spent, to be perfectly honest, more than my fair share of mornings slowly enjoying an espresso as the fog burns off the slopes of Mount Etna in the distance, the scent of blood orange blossoms mingling with the sharp aroma of coffee. This is the kind of perfect moment that embodies our cultural ethos: sacrifice enough of what you love now, and you'll make enough money that some day you'll be able to buy back those priceless experiences in the form of a luxury cruise, a meal at that new bistro or a beach house in Florida. The irony is that this perfect moment cost about 65 cents--that's less than 8 minutes wage for a cashier at McDonald's, and yet it's enough to make highly paid executives and professionals alike salivate. This should tell us something...

The finer things in life can generally be divided into two categories: material and experiential. Despite the relentless psychological barrage of advertising, most of us can readily admit that it is the experiential that is truly rewarding and fulfilling. Many even recognize their own predilection to fulfill their desire for the experiential by compensating with an excess of the material. Commercialism tells us that the experiential--that which requires time--is too costly, out of our reach. Our time, we are led to believe, must be sacrificed to meet the demands of the economy. But time is free for all of us. It is the great equalizer, something to which we all have equally random access. But in the modern economy, where average individuals cannot directly provide for themselves, they are duped into trading time for the basic necessities of life--necessities that are directly available to the poorest of the Earth. As this economic hierarchy has intensified over time, we continue to be duped into trading our time for material possessions--far beyond those required to survive. The memes of our economic culture have convinced us that the material is a fine substitute for the experiential. A nagging doubt, dissatisfaction with our own suburbanization, some unknown, unfulfilled yearning tells us that, despire the overtures of mass-media, even the materially rich among us still long for the experiential.

The sun on your face, playing with your children, staring at a fire until late into the night, sitting still in the forest listening to the wind rush through aspen leaves, talking with friends, laying on your back in a meadow and watching the clouds pass above you. All of these things are free--they require only time. Hunter-gatherers around the world spend, on average, less than 20 hours a week "working". The rest of their time was available for the experiential, the "finer things" in life. Perhaps this is why anthropologist Marshal Sahlins calls them "The Original Affluent Society", or why Paul Shepard says that humanity's time in the "hamlet economy" was the best it ever had.

The finer things in life are nothing more than a connection and a oneness with those things that modern culture insists remain separate or "sacred". This connection is available to all of us. Reconnecting to the finer things in life is not dependent on success within the modern commercial economy...on the contrary, my good friend, this reconnection requires that we take a new--or is it old?--approach to life. This is vernacular zen.

We-Think & Rhizome Design

Limited posts for this Monday and the next two Mondays as I'm studying for the Bar exam on July 29th. As time allows (or the need for a study break dictates) I'll try to include something of substance.

This week, a follow-up on last week's post on rhizome platform design, I'm recommending the book "We Think" by Charles Leadbeater. The book, itself a product of open-source collaboration, details open-source design efforts around the world, from Wikipedia to the Grameen Bank (just for good measure, I'll link to Grameen Bank via Wikipedia...). Leadbeater is probably the world's leading thinker on the future of open-source collaboration, so, while he is not specifically focused on the core rhizome concepts of self-sufficiency, decentralization, and eliminating dependencies, his theories are potential sources of inspiration.

You can read the draft of his book free at his site, or watch his You Tube video on the topic. You can also buy it on Amazon, though I had to get my copy as a UK import--not sure when it will be available mass market in the US.

Preparing the Battlefield: Iran

In light of Seymour Hersh's latest article, "Preparing the Battlefield," about stepped-up US involvement in Iran, here's post I wrote over 2 years ago on the topic:

Keep an Eye on Khuzestan

And a graphic of the oil resources and ethnic makeup of the region worth a thousand words:

Rhizome Platform Design

In the world of technology and sustainability, there is a certain “buzz” surrounding the topics of personal manufacturing and platform design. Can we get away from the hierarchal model of centralized manufacture and distribution, and replace it with a world where design emerges from open-source collaboration and is manufactured at the point of use by 3-D printers and community manufacturing centers? Can a focus on meeting community needs, rather than selling communities products that create dependence, allow for improved localized self-sufficiency by way of platform design and localized manufacture? Maybe. There are many projects and theorists already working on these notions—the intent of this article is to suggest that these efforts operate within the framework of rhizome theory, and more importantly, that these efforts recognize their inherent weaknesses that rhizome theory was developed to overcome.

One example of this trend toward community manufacturing and platform design is the LifeTrac open source tractor project. There, an online collaborative called OpenFarmTech is trying to leverage engineers, users, and innovators around the world to develop a design for an inexpensive, low-maintenance tractor that can be manufactured, used, and repaired by third-world communities. I think this is a fascinating project, and one that John Robb has highlighted as an example of the potential for community fabrication. However, it’s also an example of the potential pitfalls of thinking that platform design or personal/community manufacturing per se will advance local resilience and self-sufficiency. The LifeTrac tractor, for example, still relies on an internal combustion engine, metal-based hydraulics, and rubber tires, just to name a few components that most certainly won’t be manufactured at the community level, or derived from raw materials available at the community level. While the LifeTrac project may free rural communities from dependence on specific, for-profit tractor manufacturers, it will not free them from dependency (and the associated side effects) on distant manufactures of engines, smelters of metals, or producers of tires. While this may be an improvement, it’s a Pyrrhic victory at best, as it will only transfer to locus of their dependency-derived problems, and will not actually bolster their resiliency to external shock or their ability to extract themselves from the growth-related problems that come from lack of localized self-sufficiency.

LifeTrac embodies the problems inherent in the promise of 3-D printers, extreme-personalization, and other examples of technology-first platform design. But these problems are not inherent in the notion of platform design itself. It is possible to properly yoke the technology of platform design to the needs and objectives of creating a resilient, minimally self-sufficient community. As an example of such a rhizome approach to platform design, let’s consider mud bricks…

Like the LifeTrac’s focus on meeting community agricultural needs, mud brick technology could play a critical role in community development in many environments—leverage a global knowledge base to create buildings with low heating and cooling energy requirements, safe from earthquakes, resistant to erosion, capable of impressive structural feats, etc. Unlike LifeTrac, however, an open-source platform for use of mud brick technology need not create or continue dependencies on external sources of raw materials, external manufacturing, etc. In fact, it has the potential to significantly reduce the dependence of most developing rural communities on imported cement, and it has the potential to provide the benefits of cement (and beyond) to those minimally-developing communities that can’t afford or source cement at present. This may become in increasingly important issue in the near future as global cement production (and the energy it consumes) skyrockets. Sure, an open source platform to develop mud brick technology isn’t very sexy (unlike a tractor!), but goals like producing high R-value adobe with excellent structural properties could produce amazing results.

When considering the architectural and infrastructure issues that advanced mud brick could address, many scientists, engineers, and corporations will completely ignore the potential for using vernacular materials, instead seeing a general materials engineering problem, or an infrastructure design problem. They’ll say something like:

“Well, concrete can be effectively adapted to meet the shelter needs of people in community X. We can create an inexpensive insulated concrete form that combines the high-mass concrete with a polyurethane foam insulation to provide both high R-value, high thermal mass, and excellent structural strength.”

That works fine if the goal is to enhance dependency on non-local manufacturing, or non-local extraction of raw materials, etc. However, if the goal is to increase localized resiliency and self-sufficiency, then projects must always be pursued with that in mind. In the same example, these engineers might instead say:

“Well, concrete is out as most communities don’t have access to the raw materials, or to the energy necessary to process it. Sure, we’ll still use concrete for some applications, but where possible we will use some kind of locally-produced product. Most communities have ready access to the requirements for mud-bricks, so let’s instead find a way to use those materials to achieve the same end as an insulated concrete form.”

And then those same engineers could embark on an open-source development program that will produce flexible technologies that can be adapted by individual communities to meet their needs with locally available tools, materials, and production. How exactly will they do this? I have no idea—that’s exactly the point: when the goal of the design process is to support, not defeat, local resiliency and self-sufficiency, then that is exactly what the design process will produce. That’s the potential for combining rhizome with platform design and personal manufacturing...

One example of rhizome platform design already in action is the Cinva Ram (hat tip to BrianT). The Cinva Ram is a low-tech, low cost, but highly effective manual press for creating mud bricks out of a variety of locally-sourced materials. A team of four people can make as many as 500 bricks a day with this device, and it can be easily assembled at the community level using open-source plans. Other examples, just in the building materials arena, include advances in rammed earth construction, experiments in papercrete construction, etc.

How far can this go? Many people immediately point to modern medicine (e.g. an MRI machine) or to the internet (microprocessors) as examples of things that simply can’t be solved I this manner. They may be right. If your goal is to produce an MRI machine using only locally sourced raw materials and local manufacture, I’m pretty sure you’ll fail. However, if the goal is to produce a system of medicine that effectively serves a local community, I think there is a great deal of potential to address the problem in a truly local fashion if we can just get our goals in the right order. MRI machines are developed to make money, and they do that to the extent that they can improve health within a for-profit system. That works decently well for most people in an environment of surplus energy and amidst a solid political and economic foundation like currently exists in America or Europe. It’s a bankrupt business model in today’s third world, and quite possibly in tomorrow’s first world. While a resilient, self-sufficient community may never be able to produce its own MRI machine, I see no reason why it can’t produce an effective health-care system if it keeps that, along with local self-sufficiency, as the primary goals, and leverages a global (or even merely local) knowledge base to that end.

Nigeria - Significance of the Bonga Attack

NOTE: An updated version of this post is now available at The Oil Drum.

Militant attacks have shut in as much as 345,000 barrels per day of Nigerian oil production in the past few days. One of the attacks was against a facility 120 km offshore, demonstrating a significant new militant naval capability. This may prove to be an extremely important development: 1.25 million barrels per day of new offshore production is scheduled to come online in Nigeria over the next 6 years, and all of it was previously believed to be beyond the reach of militants.

Shell’s $3.6 billion “Bonga” Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading vessel (FPSO), 120km from shore in 1000m deep water, was recently attacked by MEND militants.

Overnight on June 19th, militants from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) struck Shell’s offshore Bonga facility, resulting in Shell declaring force majeure for deliveries of 225,000 barrels per day in June and July. Bonga, the first and largest Nigerian offshore facility, is 120km offshore. Then, on June 20th, militants destroyed a key Chevron pipeline near Escravos, Nigeria, forcing Chevron to shut-in and declare force majeure on 120,000 barrels per day. This article will analyze the significance of the Bonga attack in light of Nigeria's efforts to grow its offshore oil production.

What is at Stake?

This recent attack is particularly troubling in Nigeria, where a February, 2006 Citigroup report noted that "clearly most of the (oil production) growth near-term looks to be in the Nigerian deepwater and as such should be less subject to current disruptions." While offshore production currently only accounts for 16% of Nigeria’s oil production, it is expected to account for 90% of future growth. MEND has already demonstrated its capability to shut in significant portions of Nigeria’s onshore oil production, and now it is threatening to re-attack offshore facilities, urging expatriate workers to abandon them immediately. Significantly, Nigeria’s onshore production is already mature, and government hopes of raising total production to 4 million barrels per day are entirely dependent on the success of the offshore sector. If MEND can continue to interrupt offshore production, the prospects for any increase in production from Nigeria look dim. The situation in Nigeria is particularly important as Nigeria is one of the few states with the potential to significantly increase both production and exports. The megaproject list on WikiPedia shows 345,000 bpd of offshore production set to come online in 2008 (Agbami field, Oso field); 220,000 bpd of offshore production in 2009 (Akpo field, Oyo field); 220,000 bpd of offshore production in 2010 (Bonga North, Bonga Ullage fields); 285,000 bpd of offshore production in 2011 (Bosi, Ukot, Usan fields); 250,000 pbd of offshore production in 2012 (Bonga SW, Nsiko fields); and 150,000 bpd of offshore production in 2013 (Egina field).

That’s 1.25 million barrels per day of new offshore production planned in the next 6 years. None of it was previously considered vulnerable to attack. Now it all appears to be within the demonstrated reach of MEND.

MEND: Potential for Innovation & Improved Capabilities

This most recent offshore attack also highlights significant development in MEND’s capabilities. Comments as early as 2006 noted that MEND’s offshore capabilities are continuously improving, and that facilities as far as 50-60 km offshore may be at risk. Bonga is twice that far offshore, at 120km.

I predicted a year ago that MEND would increasingly focus on Nigeria’s offshore facilities for two reasons: to differentiate their ideologically-grounded struggle from the privateers and criminal bunkering that is also interrupting Nigerian production; and as a result of the innovation that naturally results from their decentralized structure. While this most recent attack demonstrates MEND’s ability to operate in the deepwater environment, it also shows significant room for improvement. MEND’s press release stated that their goal was to gain access to and destroy the facility's main control room, but that they were unable to do so. Their failure, however, most likely provided MEND with the specifics of what capabilities, training, and equipment they will need to succeed in the future, suggesting that the improvements in capability demonstrated in this attack are part of a larger cycle of capability improvements (an OODA Loop).

The recent attack demonstrates three significant and separate advances by MEND: targeting, naval equipment, and training. By targeting far-offshore infrastructure that was previously considered to be beyond their reach, and by targeting projects that are key to the Nigerian government’s revenue plans, MEND has accurately identified a very high return on investment target. This demonstrates an advancement in their ability to pursue “effects-based targeting”—that is, the ability to carefully select targets for their ability to produce the desired effect. For MEND, the desired effect is to force the Nigerian government to better meet the needs of the Delta peoples. Previous tactics of kidnapping and attacking pipelines were poor choices for several reasons: they spawned criminal activity within the Delta, they increased pollution in the already polluted Delta region, and they did not effectively compel the desired action on the part of the Nigerian government. While it is yet to be seen if the current targeting choices will be more successful, in my opinion they are an advancement in targeting skill on the part of MEND.

The Bonga attack also demonstrates a significant advance in MEND’s ability to operate far offshore. While MEND has always been noted for their riverine naval capability, their demonstration of offshore capability suggests an improvement in naval equipment. No information is available on what types of watercraft were used by MEND in the recent Bonga attack, but at a minimum they have demonstrated that their boats have 120km range.

Additionally, MEND demonstrated a fairly advanced set of navigation skills. Standing in a rigid inflatable boat, at 1.7 meters above the water, the visible horizon is only 5km away. Even if Shell’s Bonga facility flares at 100m above the surface, the flare is still below the horizon at 40km. Reports that the attack commenced at 1 a.m. suggest that MEND has developed fairly advanced offshore and nighttime navigation skills, that Nigeria’s naval presence in the region is not currently capable of protecting offshore facilities, and that all major Nigerian offshore facilities are within MEND’s reach.

Conclusion: Geopolitical Feedback Loops in Action

The recent attacks in Nigeria should be viewed as a product of geopolitical feedback loops. I’ve written previously about these feedback loops in operation in Nigeria, and will begin to reassess and update them in upcoming posts. These geopolitical feedback loops are significantly undermining Nigeria’s ability to deliver on their potential to increase oil production and exports. While it may be tempting to view these geopolitical feedback loops as separate from the geological phenomenon of Peak Oil, it is more accurate to view the geopolitical factors as a direct result of geological peaking—-but for geological factors, disruptions in Nigeria would simply cause oil exploration and production to move to other, equally fertile grounds. Instead, the geological reality that there are very few “geologically fertile grounds for increasing oil supply” forces companies to accept the high costs of doing business in Nigeria.

**Note: for those hoping for a rhizome post this week, I apologize... world events are conspiring against my efforts to write on a non-oil topic. Next week! Maybe...